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Summary
Over the last two decades energy has emerged as an increasingly important component of the
overall EU-Turkey relations. In particular, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) and its flagship
project, Nabucco, soon became the pivotal element of the EU-Turkey energy relations. After
years of strong cooperation, the failure of Nabucco and the emergence of TANAP have
ultimately outlined a divergence in the way the EU and Turkey perceive not only the SGC but
also their energy relations. This divergence represents a serious risk for the strategic interests
of both the EU and Turkey, and for this reason there is a need to rethink the EU-Turkey energy
relations. This need is now particularly urgent, as the market and political environment on
which Nabucco was conceptualized is rapidly changing, potentially opening up new
opportunities of energy cooperation for the EU and Turkey. On the supply side, new major gas
reserves have been discovered in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and in offshore Israel,
while on the demand side the unprecedented political standoff between the Western world
and Russia resulted by the 2014 Ukraine crisis might reinvigorate the EU’s quest to diversify its
gas supply portfolio. These developments can potentially converge to reshape the EU-Turkey
energy relations. In fact, in this scenario the SGC could eventually gain a new momentum, with
the gas reserves of the KRI and Israel as primary target. However, after the failure of Nabucco
the unconditional support of Turkey should not be taken for granted by the EU, as the country
might prefer to secure its own energy supply on a bilateral basis with gas producing countries.
In order to avoid the risk of a further fragmentation of the SGC, a new “EU-Turkey Natural Gas
Initiative” -such as the one proposed in this paper- seems to be urgently needed, for the
benefit of both the EU and Turkey.
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This paper represents the fifth outcome of the FEEM research project “The rise of Turkey and
the new Mediterranean. Challenges and opportunities for energy cooperation in a region in
transition”. This programme analyses how energy could represent a major tool to strengthen
the economic, political and social integration in the enlarged Euro-Mediterranean region. The
project focuses particularly on Turkey, a country considered as crucial for both the EU energy
security and for the regional balance of power in the aftermath of the so-called “Arab Spring”.

FEEM Note di Lavoro

2

The rise of Turkey and the new Mediterranean
Research programme

The EU-Turkey energy relations: the pivotal role of the Southern Gas Corridor
Over the last two decades energy has emerged as an increasingly important component
of the overall cooperation scheme being built between the European Union (EU) and
Turkey. In particular, over the years the EU-Turkey energy relations have progressively
focused on a specific segment of energy markets: natural gas.
This focus on natural gas has been mainly based on Turkey’s strategic geographical
location at the crossroads of major natural gas-rich regions such the Caspian and the
Middle East on the one hand, and a major natural gas-consuming region, Europe, on the
other hand. This peculiar position has paved the way for the emergence of a vision on
which Turkey would eventually play the role of key transit country of future natural gas
flows from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq and Iran to Europe1.
The rise and fall of Nabucco
This vision was first translated into an infrastructure project in 2002, when a fivecompany consortium composed by OMV of Austria, MOL Group of Hungary,
Bulgargaz of Bulgaria, Transgaz of Romania and BOTAŞ of Turkey2 agreed to
cooperate on the development of Nabucco, a projected 3,800 kilometers (km) long
pipeline with a capacity of 31 billion cubic metres per year (bcm/year) designed to carry
natural gas extracted in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Iran and Egypt to Southeast and
Central Europe via Turkey3. The project immediately got an unprecedented political
support from Turkey, the EU and the United States (US).
For Turkey the project represented a unique opportunity to realize its long-term strategic
objective of becoming a key energy corridor between hydrocarbon rich countries in the
East and energy importing European markets in the West.
For the EU the project represented a major opportunity to diversify its natural gas
supplies away from Russia. For this reason Nabucco not only got the financial support
of the EU4 but also became the flagship project of the Southern Gas Corridor, an
initiative for the natural gas supply from Caspian and Middle Eastern regions to Europe
launched in 2008 by the European Commission (EC)5 as a response to the energy
1

For a detailed discussion of the potential role of Turkey as a regional natural gas hub please refer to:
Tagliapietra, S. (2014), Turkey as a Regional Natural Gas Hub: Myth or Reality?, Nota di Lavoro n.
2.2014, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
2
The consortium was successively extended to RWE of Germany in 2008.
3
Natural gas flows from these producing countries would have reached the Turkish border as follow: via
the South Caucasus Pipeline in the case of Azerbaijan; via Iran or the planned Trans-Caspian Pipeline in
the case of Turkmenistan; via the planned extension of the Arab Gas Pipeline in the case of Iraq; via the
Arab Gas Pipeline in the case of Egypt.
4
The European Commission awarded a grant in the amount of 50 percent of the estimated total eligible
cost of the feasibility study including market analysis, and technical, economic and financial studies.
5
European Commission, Second Strategic Energy Review – An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action
Plan. COM(2008) 781 final, 13 November 2008. The document recognized in the Southern Gas Corridor
one of the EU’s highest energy security priorities, outlying the need of a joint work between the EC, EU
Member States and the countries concerned (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, Iraq and Mashreq countries)
with the objective of rapidly securing firm commitments for the supply of natural gas and the construction
of the pipelines necessary for all stages of its development.
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security concerns emerged in the EU after the first Russian-Ukrainian-European natural
gas crisis occurred in January 20066.
For the US the project represented an important geopolitical asset to reduce the EU
natural gas dependency on Russia, exactly as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline served
in the 1990s to reduce the EU oil dependency on Russia7.
Strong of the political backing of Turkey, the EU and the US, the Nabucco project
gradually advanced with the signature of the joint venture agreement between the five
companies initially involved in the consortium in 20058, with the signature of a
declaration calling for the acceleration of the Nabucco project by the EC and energy
ministers from Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey in 20069, with the
signature of the first contract to supply natural gas from Azerbaijan in 200810, with the
signature of the intergovernmental agreement between the five transit countries in
200911 and, finally, with the signature of the project support agreements between the
Nabucco consortium and each of the five transit countries in 201112.
Notwithstanding the strong political commitment of the five transit countries and the
unprecedented political support of the EU and the US, the Nabucco project ultimately
failed, mainly because of commercial and financial reasons. As Hafner (2012) pointed
out: «The Nabucco project has died because of the market uncertainties: a very large
scale pipeline project combined with a hugely uncertain demand outlook and the
potential competition of South Stream. Moreover, the project promoters were mainly
mid-size companies who have to rely on project finance and bank loans, and the banks
ask for guarantees and long term ship or pay contracts which the market today cannot
deliver.»13 Furthermore, another major element of uncertainty for the Nabucco project
was related to the fact that -with the only exception of Azerbaijan- all the potential
suppliers were facing major difficulties to materialize their willingness to evacuate
natural gas to Europe via Turkey.

6

In January 2006, after a long-lasting disagreement on natural gas prices, Russia cut off supplies to
Ukraine for 3 days, Ukraine diverted volumes destined to Europe, and as a consequence natural gas
supply to some Central European countries fell briefly. A second Russian-Ukrainian-European natural gas
crisis occurred in 2009, when the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine was completely halted for two
weeks, a fact that generated a severe humanitarian crisis in several Central and Eastern European
countries. For a detailed discussion of these two natural gas crises refer to: Stern, J. (2006), The RussianUkrainian gas crisis of January 2006, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies; and to: Pirani, S., Stern, J. and
Yafimava, K. (2009), The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment,
OIES paper: NG27, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
7
“U.S. throws weight behind EU’s Nabucco pipeline”, in Reuters, 22 February 2008.
8
“Nabucco Partners Sign Joint Venture Agreement”, in Middle East Economic Survey, 11 July 2005.
9
“EU Commission, Ministers Agree To Accelerate Nabucco Gas Project”, in Middle East Economic
Survey, 3 July 2006.
10
“Azeri Energy Minister Announces Readiness To Join Nabucco Project”, in Middle East Economic
Survey, 8 September 2008.
11
“Nabucco Partners Sign Intergovernmental Agreement”, in Middle East Economic Survey, 20 July
2009.
12
“Nabucco Legally Finalized as Transit States Sign Project Support Agreements”, in Novinite, 8 June
2011.
13
Hafner, M. (2012), Russian Strategy on Infrastructure and Gas Flows to Europe, POLINARES
Working Paper n. 73, p. 41.
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The Southern Gas Corridor beyond Nabucco: TANAP and TAP
Taking into account the insurmountable commercial and financial barriers that the
Nabucco project was facing, Azerbaijan -clearly the natural gas producing country most
interested on the development of the Southern Gas Corridor14- completely reshaped the
Southern Gas Corridor game in 2011 by rapidly conceptualizing its own infrastructure
project to evacuate future natural gas flows from Shah Deniz Phase II to Turkey: the
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP).
TANAP, a projected 2,000 km-long natural gas pipeline with a capacity of 16 bcm/year,
has been designed to supply 6 bcm/year to Turkey by 2018 and 10 bcm/year to Europe
by 2019. On the contrary of Nabucco, TANAP was not born as a multilateral project but
rather as a bilateral project between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The initial act of the project
-occurred in December 2011- was the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) between Azerbaijan and Turkey establishing a consortium to build and operate
the pipeline15. This initial step was then followed by the signature of a binding
intergovernmental agreement on TANAP made by Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev and
Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdoğan in June 201216. Of course this bilateral relation was
not symmetric, but rather unbalanced in favour of Azerbaijan. In fact, the State Oil
Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) was initially set to hold an 80 percent stake in the
project, leaving only the remaining 20 percent to the Turkish partners (15 percent to
BOTAŞ and 5 percent to TPAO). This figure has changed over time, to a more balanced
structure entailing a share of 58 percent for SOCAR, 25 percent for BOTAŞ, 5 percent
for TPAO and 12 percent for British Petroleum17. Notwithstanding this realignment of
shares, SOCAR is set to continue to retain a controlling 51% of TANAP and
operatorship of the line in the future. In fact, TANAP is crucially important for the
Azeri state owned company, as it will have a key role in the delivery of natural gas from
its Shah Deniz field further down the supply chain to Europe, rather than selling at its
border.
Among other factors, a key element of strength of the TANAP project relates to its
financing: because of the considerable oil revenues provided by the exports through the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Azerbaijan is able to directly ensure the financing of the
infrastructure. In fact, the cost of TANAP is estimated about USD 7-10 billion18, an
amount that Azerbaijan could easily finance just by making use of its sovereign wealth
fund, the State Oil Fund, which currently retains about USD 34 billion in assets under
management19.
The entrance of TANAP into the Southern Gas Corridor race in December 2011 gave
the “coup de grace” to the already moribund Nabucco project. For this reason the
14

Not only because of the investments already made on its Shah Deniz natural gas field, but also because
of the need to reach a final investment decision for Shah Deniz Phase II (a decision that finally arrived on
December 17, 2013).
15
“Turkey and Azerbaijan Sign MoU for TANAP Pipeline”, in Middle East Economic Survey, 9 January
2012.
16
“TANAP Project, the Silk Road of Energy, Has Been Signed”, http://www.tanap.com, 26 June 2012.
17
“Turkish Companies Increase Their Shares in TANAP Up To 30%”, Azeri News Agency, 2 June 2014.
18
“BP Agrees to Join Tanap Gas Pipeline Project by Taking 12% Stake”, in Bloomberg, 23 January 2013.
19
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.

FEEM Note di Lavoro

5

The rise of Turkey and the new Mediterranean
Research programme

Nabucco consortium tried to reinvent itself in 2012, by proposing a new -and smallerversion of the project: Nabucco West20. This pipeline was designed to carry the TANAP
10 bcm/year destined to Europe from the Turkish-European border to Austria via
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. This project -again supported by the EU21- ultimately
failed like its predecessor, as the Shah Deniz consortium selected in June 2013 the
Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to provide the missing link between TANAP and the
European market22. TAP, a projected 800 km-long natural gas pipeline with an initial
capacity of 10 bcm/year, will thus carry the TANAP natural gas destined to Europe
from the Turkish-Greek border to Italy through Albania and the Adriatic Sea by 201923.
The current shape of the Southern Gas Corridor: a half-empty glass?
The historical evolution of the Southern Gas Corridor, and particularly the rise and fall
of Nabucco, clearly exemplifies how the original idea of a multilateral and large-scale
project based on a variety of natural gas supply sources, turned out to be a bilateral and
medium-scale project with only one supply source, Azerbaijan. This evolution does not
completely fulfill neither the interest of the EU nor the interest of Turkey, not only
because of the different market structure (both in terms of volumes and supply sources)
but also because of the different legal structure of the two projects.
In fact, Nabucco was a project completely under EU law; this signifies that the pipeline
was to be regulated by rules such as third party access and unbundling throughout its
entire length. The intergovernmental agreement signed by the five transit countries in
2009 provided a legal framework for 50 years, confirming that 50 percent of the
pipeline’s capacity was to be reserved for the shareholders of the project and the
remaining 50 percent was to be offered to third-party shippers on the basis of a
regulatory transit regime under EU law24.
The situation of TANAP is clearly very different. In fact, considering that Turkey has
not yet adopted the EU energy acquis on its legislation, Azerbaijan -with a major stake
in the project- will practically have the control of the pipeline and of the natural gas
20

“Nabucco-West: Abridged Pipeline Project Officially Submitted to Shah Deniz Consortium”, in
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 9, Issue 98, 23 May 2012.
21
European Commission, Commissioner Oettinger welcomes decision on "Nabucco West" pipeline, Press
Release, 28 June 2012. The Nabucco West project was also supported by British Petroleum (BP), the
operator of Shah Deniz Phase II. In fact, in order to support Nabucco West, in June 2012 BP ceased the
development of its South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP), a project launched in September 2011 to carry the
TANAP 10 bcm/year destined to Europe from the Turkish-European border to Austria.
22
“Shah Deniz consortium chooses TAP to carry Azeri gas to Europe”, in Reuters, 28 June 2013.
Nabucco West also had the support of British Petroleum. In September 2011 British Petroleum also
proposed a pipeline project, the so-called South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP), to carry the TANAP 10
bcm/year destined to Europe from the Turkish-European border to Austria. Albeit designed by the
operator of Shah Deniz Phase II .
23
The TAP project was announced in 2003 by Swiss energy company EGL Group. The feasibility study
was concluded in March 2006. Two options were investigated: a northern route through Bulgaria,
Republic of Macedonia and Albania, and a southern route through Greece and Albania, which finally was
considered to be more feasible.
24
“Nabucco: Delivering Diversification to the European Gas Market”, in Natural Gas Europe, 23 May
2013.
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transit through it. Moreover, considering both Turkey’s reluctance to enter the Energy
Community and the difficulties related to the opening of the energy chapter of Turkey’s
EU accession process, this situation will unlikely change in the foreseeable future.
Albeit Azerbaijan could eventually have an interest in having some volumes of nonAzeri natural gas into TANAP temporarily in the short term (in order to make the
project more bankable), it will unlikely have the interest of doing so in the longer term,
as the development of Shah Deniz and other fields will continue and additional volumes
of Azeri natural gas will thus be ready to be evacuated to Turkey and the EU via
TANAP.
The Southern Gas Corridor: pivot or Achilles' heel of EU-Turkey energy relations?
The developments of the Southern Gas Corridor just described ultimately call into
question the EU-Turkey energy relations. In particular, a major question is whether the
Southern Gas Corridor would have evolved from being a pivotal element of the EUTurkey energy relations to becoming their Achilles’ hell. In fact, the odyssey of
Nabucco and the emergence of TANAP have ultimately outlined a progressive
divergence in the way the EU and Turkey perceived not only the Southern Gas Corridor
but also their energy relations.
As previously discussed, after years of cooperation with the EU on Nabucco, in 2011
Turkey rapidly decided to change its approach and turn to Azerbaijan to speed-up the
development of the Southern Gas Corridor. This choice clearly reflected the fact that
«the primary aim of Turkey is to realize its own energy security»25, but it also reflected
a genuine discontent of Turkey towards the EU due to the continuous procrastination of
the accession negotiations in general and to the vagueness of the EU about the opening
of the accession process’s energy chapter in particular26.
This divergence represents a serious risk not only for the EU-Turkey energy relations,
but also for the strategic interests of the two players individually. A coherent and
coordinated approach on the Southern Gas Corridor would indeed allow the two players
to pursue their respective interests in a much more effective way. First of all, by dealing
together with natural gas producing countries the EU and Turkey could well enhance
their bargaining power. Secondly, a coherent approach on the infrastructural
development could allow the overcoming of a number of political and commercial
barriers, respectively through the enhancement of their political and diplomatic leverage
and the achievement of economies of scale.
The experience of Nabucco certainly left a negative legacy in Turkey as far as the
energy cooperation with the EU is concerned. However, strategically speaking it is
necessary to find a way to revive the EU-Turkey energy relations -and notably the EUTurkey natural gas relations- particularly considering that the market and political
environment on which Nabucco was conceptualized is rapidly changing and that some
of the major barriers to the development of Nabucco could now be vanishing.
25

Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s Energy Strategy, available online.
For a detailed discussion of this point please refer to: Korany, D. and Sartori, N. (2013), EU-Turkish
Energy Relations in the Context of the EU Accession Negotiations: Focus on Natural Gas, Global Turkey
in Europe, Istituto Affari Internazionali.
26

FEEM Note di Lavoro

7

The rise of Turkey and the new Mediterranean
Research programme

Boosting the EU-Turkey energy relations in a rapidly changing environment
Since the time of the Nabucco’ odyssey a lot has changed in the regional market and
political environment. First of all, new major natural gas reserves have been discovered
in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and in offshore Israel. Secondly, an
unprecedented political standoff between the Western world and Russia has
materialized with the 2014 Ukraine crisis, paving the way for a serious reconsideration
at the EU level of the economic relations between Europe and Russia. Let’s have a
closer look at these recent developments before to analyse their potential impact on the
EU-Turkey energy relations.
The rise of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a world-class natural gas province
Iraq’s natural gas scenario is radically changing because of the enormous natural gas
reserves being discovered in the country’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region. With
natural gas reserves estimated between 3 and 6 trillion cubic metres (tcm)27, this
northern region is actually paving the way for the emergence of Iraq as world-class
natural gas province (just to provide a quick comparison, Azerbaijan owns 1.3 tcm of
natural gas reserves)28. With this consistent amount of natural gas reserves, the KRI
could easily satisfy its own domestic natural gas demand and also export significant
volumes of natural gas to Turkey and the EU.
In the short term, the key barrier to a quick development of KRI natural gas resources is
of course represented by the unstable political situation emerged in the country with the
rapid escalation of violence started in June 2014. However, this situation might well
turn out to be geo-politically beneficial for the KRI, either in terms of more autonomy
from Baghdad and in territorial terms. In addition to this unforeseeable escalation of
events, a long-lasting dispute on state sovereignty between the KRG in Erbil and the
Iraqi Federal Government in Baghdad continues to remain on the table. In a nutshell,
Baghdad and Erbil are at odds over the KRG’s desire for autonomy and the central
government’s desire for sovereignty and control29. This debate translates into the energy
sector as well, as the governments in Baghdad and Erbil have been unable to resolve
their differences over the federal hydrocarbon law. This dispute generates significant
political risk and is already creating a number of problems with regard to oil export to
Turkey. The US, which enjoys close diplomatic ties with both Baghdad and Ankara, has
been pressing all parties to reach an agreement and is known to oppose Erbil’s
unilateralist energy plans.
These recent developments represent a key element for the future prospects of the
Southern Gas Corridor, as the KRI -after Azerbaijan- is the only natural gas producing
player that could turn in the medium term its availability of natural gas resources into
deliverability. In fact, the other countries usually seen as potential suppliers for the

27

Official estimation of the Kurdistan Regional Government.
British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2013.
29
For a wider discussion on Iraq’s internal divisions please refer to: Elliott, S. and Beryl, L. (2012),
Natural Gas Development in Kurdistan: A Financial Assessment, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University.
28
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Southern Gas Corridor -Turkmenistan and Iran- seem to be very far from being able to
eventually supply the Corridor.
Turkmenistan has established a special natural gas relationship with China, and this
trend is likely to consolidate further in the future. However, given its world-class natural
gas reserves, the country could well be able to supply natural gas to Turkey and to the
EU -in addition to the major volumes targeting the Chinese market- but a major barrier
will likely make such a development unfeasible: the infrastructural problem related to
the divergences existing between Russia, Iran, and Turkmenistan on the legal status of
the Caspian Sea, and therefore on the construction of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline.
In order to try to bypass this problem, in 2010 Eni proposed to Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan a compressed natural gas (CNG) project that would permit the transport
and transit of considerable volumes of Turkmen gas across the Caspian Sea to the coast
of Azerbaijan, from where it would be transported through an overland pipeline to other
destinations. At the time, this project was halted by Azerbaijan, as it did not want
Turkmen gas to compete with its resources being developed. Such a project could be
revived in the future if Azerbaijan would temporarily need additional volumes to fill the
TANAP pipeline, while waiting for additional production in Shah Deniz. However, this
solution will likely be very costly and very limited in both time and volumes. For this
reason, the aspiration of the EU to bring major volumes of Turkmen natural gas into the
Southern Gas Corridor would probably need to be revised, at least until the dispute over
the legal status of the Caspian Sea will finally be resolved30.
Iran is the perennial “elephant in the room” of the international gas trade, a country that
could, one day, become a major game changer of world’s gas markets, but whose
potential still remains fundamentally untapped due to a number of geopolitical and
commercial reasons. The main reason for the current under-exploitation of Iran’s natural
gas resources is clearly linked to the difficult political relations that have evolved over
the last decades with the West. However, after years of frustration and impasse in
negotiations between Iran and six world powers (P5+1), an interim Iranian nuclear deal
was finally reached in Geneva on November 24, 2013. This occurrence certainly
represents just a first step toward a truly complete resolution of the Iranian nuclear
issue, but it could be seen as a positive sign for the future. If this recent positive
development will have effective follow-up steps, great opportunities could open up in
Iran, including on the natural gas sector. However, considering the geographical
location of Iran’s natural gas reserves (mainly concentrated in the Southern part of the
country, in the offshore Persian Gulf), such a development will likely first interest the
global LNG market before interesting the European market via pipeline. Furthermore,
the first international pipeline that the country will likely develop will not target the EU
market, but the Asian market. In fact, Iran is already working on a pipeline to Pakistan,
in order to export its natural gas not only to this country but also to India. Moreover,
Chinese interest in Iran’s natural gas reserves is also very strong, and Iranian natural gas
exports to China will likely take place in the future as well. For these reasons it seems

30

For a detailed discussion of Turkmenistan’s natural gas market please refer to: Pirani, S. (2012),
Central Asian and Caspian Gas Production and the Constraints on Export, OIES Paper: NG 69, Oxford
Institute for Energy Studies.
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that in the medium-term Iran would hardly fit into the Southern Gas Corridor concept,
as it will first target the global LNG market and Asian markets via pipeline31.
The emergence of Israel as natural gas exporting country
The energy landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean region is rapidly changing and
Israel is the key driver of this recent development. Offshore exploration in the waters of
the Eastern Mediterranean region started in the early 1970’s and sporadically continued
during the 1980’s and the 1990’s. Exploration activity in the offshore Eastern
Mediterranean experienced a significant renaissance since 1999-2000, when five modest
natural gas fields were discovered at a shallow depth west of the coastal town of
Ashqelon and the Gaza Strip. These discoveries speeded up exploration efforts and
promoted the acquisition of geophysical data throughout the entire Eastern
Mediterranean area, particularly in the Levant basin. The real turning point in terms of
natural gas discoveries came in 2009, when Noble Energy announced the discovery of
the Tamar field (250 bcm) in offshore Israel. After this first major discovery, Noble
Energy announced other two major findings in the Levant Basin: the Leviathan field
(535 bcm) in offshore Israel (2010) and the Aphrodite field (140 bcm) in offshore
Cyprus (2011).
Owning the largest natural gas reserves in the offshore Eastern Mediterranean, Israel
has a pivotal role in the emerging regional natural gas architecture. In other words, a
large-scale development of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas seems to be very difficult
without a strong commitment of Israel to export a substantial part of its gas resources.
After a long-lasting debate, in 2013 the Israeli government decided to keep 540 bcm of
natural gas for the domestic market over a 25-year period, leaving only 360 bcm or 40%
of projected supply for export. This development has enhanced the discussion on
Israel’s natural gas export options. In fact, many options are currently on the table, even
if none of them is yet a frontrunner: a) Construction of a pipeline to Turkey (via
Lebanon and Syria or via the Republic of Cyprus EEZ); b) Construction of a pipeline to
Jordan and to the Palestinian Territories; c) Utilization of the existing pipeline from
Ashkelon to Egypt -reversing the flow- and then utilization of the Egyptian LNG plant
in Idku; d) Construction of a submarine pipeline from the Leviathan field to the
Egyptian LNG plant in Idku; e) Construction of an onshore LNG plant on Israel’s
Mediterranean coast; f) Construction of a LNG plant on the Israeli shore of the Gulf of
Aqaba; g) Development of a FLNG plant in the Israeli offshore Mediterranean;
h) Development of a compressed natural gas (CNG) solution; i) Construction of a
pipeline to Cyprus and construction of a joint Israeli-Cypriot LNG plant in Vasilikos32.

31

For a detailed discussion of the future prospects of Iran’s natural gas market please refer to:
Tagliapietra, S. (2014), Iran after the (potential) nuclear deal. What’s next for the country’s natural gas
market?, Nota di Lavoro n. 31.2014, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
32
For a comprehensive discussion of the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas developments please refer to:
Tagliapietra, S. (2013), Towards a New Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor? Natural Gas
Developments Between Market Opportunities and Political Risks, Nota di Lavoro n. 12.2013, Fondazione
Eni Enrico Mattei.
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The 2014 Ukraine crisis and the unprecedented EU-Russia political standoff
The dawn of the 2014 Ukraine crisis dates back to November 21, 2013, the day on
which Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych rejected the Ukraine-EU Association
Agreement and the related Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, two
measures of economic and trade incentives offered by the EU to Ukraine within the
framework of the Eastern partnership, an initiative aimed at strengthening cooperation
with countries in the former USSR and implicitly containing the influence of Russia in
the region. On the same day, thousands of people gathered to Independence Square in
central Kiev to take part in a rally against the choices of Yanukovych and in favor of
greater integration with the EU.
From that moment on the Euromaidan (literally Eurosquare) protests never stopped,
finally leading to the deposition of President Yanukovych on February 22 and to the
establishment of a pro-European government on February 27. In the aftermath of this
regime change, pro-Russian forces began to gradually take control of the Crimean
peninsula. In the meantime, a referendum on the status of Crimea was held on March
16, resulting in a 96% vote in favor of the option to join Russia as a federal subject. The
legitimacy of the referendum was immediately rejected by the EU, the US and Canada,
while Russia instantly recognized the result. On March 18 Russia and Crimea signed a
treaty of accession of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian
Federation.
Following these events, the EU and the US imposed sanctions on a number of Russian
and Ukrainian officials involved in Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula.
Furthermore, the European Commission decided on March 10 to postpone talks with
Russia over the legal status of the planned South Stream pipeline and full capacity
utilization of the existing Nord Stream line. Both issues required a compromise to move
forward, but this appeared unlikely and for this reason EU Energy Commissioner
Guenther Oettinger declared that he will not advance talks about pipelines such as South
Stream for the time being33. The European Commission has also delayed a decision on
exempting the Opal pipeline from Germany to the Czech Republic from the EU’s thirdparty access rules. This means the 55 bcm/year Nord Stream pipeline, built under the
Baltic Sea to supply Russian gas to Europe, will have to continue running below full
capacity34. South Stream, a projected pipeline aimed at delivering 63 bcm/year of
Russian gas to Europe under the Black Sea, represents -together with Nord Stream- the
cornerstone of Russia’s strategy to evacuate natural gas to Europe bypassing Ukraine.
A serious delay of the project will thus turn out to be a major damage for Russia, both
under the political and commercial points of view.
The EU heads of state and government gathered in Brussels on March 20-21 for an EU
Council mainly devoted to an in depth discussion on the situation in Ukraine and of
course a major focus was devoted to energy. In fact, the EU Council concluded that
«efforts to reduce Europe’s high gas energy dependency rates should be intensified,
33
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especially for the most dependent Member States»35. The EU leaders also tasked the
European Commission to elaborate a plan for reducing energy dependence from Russia,
to be discussed at the EU summit of June 26-27. According to the conclusions of the EU
Council: «The plan should reflect the fact that the EU needs to accelerate further
diversification of its energy supply, increase its bargaining power and energy efficiency,
continue to develop renewable and other indigenous energy sources and coordinate the
development of the infrastructure to support this diversification in a sustainable manner,
including through the development of interconnections. Such interconnections should
also include the Iberian peninsula and the Mediterranean area. Where relevant,
interconnections should also be developed with third countries. Member States will
show solidarity in case of sudden disruptions of energy supply in one or several
Member States. In addition, further action should be taken to support the development
of the Southern Corridor, including further spur routes through Eastern Europe, to
examine ways to facilitate natural gas exports from North America to the EU and
consider how this may best be reflected in TTIP, and increase the transparency of
Intergovernmental Agreements in the field of energy»36.
The European Commission published its plan for reducing energy dependence from
Russia on May, 26 with the Communication “European Energy Security Strategy”37.
With this document the European Commission outlines once more the need to reinforce
the EU’s energy security, particularly in terms of natural gas supplies. The strategy
proposed is structured on eight key pillars aimed at promoting closer cooperation
among Member States in light of the principle of solidarity, while respecting national
energy choices: «i) Immediate actions aimed at increasing the EU’s capacity to
overcome a major disruption during the winter 2014/2015; ii) Strengthening
emergency/solidarity mechanisms including coordination of risk assessment and
contingency plans; iii) Moderating energy demand; iv) Building a well-functioning and
fully integrated internal market; v) Increasing energy production in the EU; vi) Further
developing energy technologies; vii) Diversifying external supplies and related
infrastructure; viii) Improving coordination of national energy policies and speaking
with one voice in external energy policy»38.
As far as the diversification of external natural gas supplies is concerned, the strategy
designed by the European Commission outlines that «beyond strengthening our [EU’]
relationship with existing suppliers, a EU policy goal should also be to open the way for
new sources. The establishment of the Southern Corridor and the identified projects of
common interest is an important element in this respect, as it prepares the ground for
supplies from the Caspian region and beyond. Pursuing an active trade agenda in this
region is crucial to ensure market access but also for the development of critical
infrastructure, the viability of which depends on access to sufficient export volumes. In
a first phase it is expected that by 2020 10 bcm/y of natural gas produced in Azerbaijan
will reach the European market through the southern Gas Corridor. Moreover, this new
35

European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 7/1/14 REV1, 29/21 March 2014, p. 10.
Ibidem, p. 10.
37
European Commission, European Energy Security Strategy, COM(2014) 330 final, 28 May 2014. This
official document is accompanied by a major study on the state of the European energy security:
European Commission, In depth study of European Energy Security, SWD(2014) 330 final, 28 May 2014.
38
European Commission, European Energy Security Strategy, op. cit., p. 3.
36

FEEM Note di Lavoro

12

The rise of Turkey and the new Mediterranean
Research programme

pipeline connection is vital in providing a connection to the Middle East. The currently
envisaged infrastructure in Turkey could accommodate up to 25 bcm/y for the European
market. In the longer term perspective, other countries such as Turkmenistan, Iraq and
Iran, if conditions are met to lift the sanctions regime, could also significantly contribute
to the enlargement of the Southern Gas Corridor. A coherent and targeted Foreign
policy vis-à-vis these countries will be crucial. Furthermore, the EU should engage in
intensified political and trade dialogue with Northern African and Eastern
Mediterranean partners, in particular with a view to creating a Mediterranean gas hub in
the South of Europe.»39
This strategy designed by the European Commission was discussed in the European
Council of June 26-27, 2014 and a formal political decision from the European Council
is expected by the end of 2014.
Without entering the discussion on the pro and cons of the EU strategy to diversify its
natural gas supplies away from Russia, let’s try to understand what might be the
potential impact of the recent discoveries of natural gas in the KRI and in offshore Israel
on the one hand, and of the 2014 Ukraine crisis on the other hand, on the EU-Turkey
energy relations.
The potential impact of these new developments on the EU-Turkey energy relations
Albeit apparently far from each other, the recent discoveries of natural gas in the KRI
and in offshore Israel, and the 2014 Ukraine crisis, are two developments potentially
interconnected, as they can eventually converge to reshape the EU-Turkey energy
relations. In fact, if in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis the EU will seriously pursue a
strategy of progressive diversification of its natural gas supplies away from Russia, it
will likely focus on enhancing the internal energy market (i.e. through natural gas
interconnections), on developing the European LNG market (this time with a particular
reference on the potential imports from the US) and on further diversifying the EU
natural gas supply portfolio. In particular, as the “European Energy Security Strategy”
of the European Commission seems to suggest, the EU will likely try to further enhance
the development of the Southern Gas Corridor.
Of course this strategy will likely not have the impossible target of reducing by 100
percent the EU dependence on Russian gas, but it will certainly target a substantial
reduction not only for its direct impact in terms of energy security but also for its
indirect impact concerning the related gain of bargaining power in the next round of renegotiation of Russian contracts. If so, this strategy will not be very different from the
one adopted by the EU in 2008 with the Communication “Second Strategic Energy
Review - An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan”40, the one launching the
Southern Gas Corridor. However, as far as the Southern Gas Corridor is concerned, this
time the situation could well turn out to be different from 2008, exactly for the two
reasons described above: the availability of major natural gas reserves in the KRI and in
offshore Israel on the supply side and the potential absence of competition -at least for a
39
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certain period of time- from South Stream on the demand side as a result of the 2014
Ukraine crisis.
Notwithstanding these positive elements for the Southern Gas Corridor, this time a new
element should be taken into consideration by the EU: the role of Turkey. In fact, a
collaborative approach from Turkey should not be taken for granted. As mentioned
before, Nabucco did not left a positive legacy in Turkey as far as the energy cooperation
with the EU is concerned and it paved the way for a new form of bilateral energy
diplomacy between Turkey and natural gas producing countries. Azerbaijan certainly
represents the clearest example of this dynamic, but another, more recent example, of
this dynamic could be found in the relation between Turkey and the KRI itself. In fact,
in November 2013 the Government of Turkey and the KRG signed a Gas Sales
Agreement (GSA) governing the export of natural gas from the KRI to Turkey. The
GSA calls for an initial 4 bcm/year of natural gas exports from 2017, rising to 10
bcm/year by 2020 and the option of increasing to 20 bcm/year thereafter; volumes that
Turkey will of course use for its domestic market, considering that its natural gas
demand is likely to grow from 45 bcm/year in 2012 to 70 bcm/year in 203041.
The risk that the Southern Gas Corridor is facing is thus the one of another policy
fragmentation between EU and Turkey. A fragmentation that could potentially generate
rivalries between the two players, paving the way for the derail of the EU-Turkey
energy relations. This occurrence will be detrimental to the interests of the EU and
Turkey themselves, and will also provide more bargaining power to natural gas
producing countries. This is the reason why a new EU-Turkey Natural Gas Initiative
seems to be urgently needed, for the benefit of both the two players.
The urgent need for a new EU-Turkey Natural Gas Initiative
As an overall trend, a new EU-Turkey Natural Gas Initiative might be based on a winwin cooperation scheme able to engage the two players in a sustainable way.
The prospect of becoming a natural gas hub will not be sufficient to seriously engage
Turkey in such a cooperation project, as it already demonstrated that its first energy
policy priority is to secure its own energy supplies. The EU might acknowledge this
policy priority of Turkey and design accordingly a natural gas cooperation scheme able
to match both the security of natural gas supplies of the EU and Turkey at one fell
swoop.
In particular, a new EU-Turkey Natural Gas Initiative could be developed on the basis
of the following key axes:
 Energy diplomacy to unlock the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s gas supplies. In
addition to the overall unstable situation generated by the recent escalation of events
started in June 2014 (which could -as mentioned before- ultimately turn out to be geopolitically beneficial for the KRI), the main obstacle to the development of the KRI’s
natural gas reserves is represented by the dispute between the KRG in Erbil and the
Iraqi Federal Government in Baghdad about the federal hydrocarbon law and the related
issue of revenue sharing. Turkey has little diplomatic leverage in contributing to the
41
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resolution of this dispute. For this reason, the first (longer-term) target of the Initiative
might be the creation of a joint diplomatic task force between the EU, Turkey and the
US, to mediate between the governments of Erbil and Baghdad in order to achieve a
quick resolution of the dispute.
 Energy diplomacy to allow Israeli gas exports to Turkey. As previously
described, since 2010 the Eastern Mediterranean has emerged as a potential world-class
natural gas province. In particular, Israel plays a major role in this field, as it owns the
largest natural gas reserves. As far as Israel’s natural gas export projects are concerned,
ten options are currently under evaluation, between pipelines, liquefied natural gas
(LNG) and floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) solutions. A pipeline connecting Israel
with Turkey is often presented as the most commercially viable export option. Turcas
Petrol, a Turkish company, in September 2013 formally proposed a pipeline connecting
the Israeli Leviathan field with the southern shore of Turkey with a capacity of 16
bcm/year. This volume, equivalent to the one of TANAP, would of course be split
between the Turkish market (i.e. 6 bcm/year) and the EU market (i.e. 10 bcm/year).
However, considering that this pipeline would need to pass through waters which lie
within the Republic of Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), this project is today
politically unfeasible. Turkey does not have any diplomatic leverage to enhance this
situation. For this reason, a second (shorter-term) target of the Initiative might consist of
an engagement of the EU in convincing its Member State to allow the transit of the
pipeline through its EEZ independently from a full resolution of the long-lasting Cyprus
dispute, in order to allow the evacuation of Israeli natural gas to the EU and Turkey.
 Market reforms to facilitate energy infrastructure investments. Looking at the
future, Turkey will need enormous investments on energy infrastructure, most notably
on electricity and gas infrastructure. According to the Investment Support and
Promotion Agency of Turkey (ISPAT), Turkey’s energy investment requirements
amount to USD 120 billion by 202342. International investors will need to find a
favourable investment climate in order to jump into this market and also for this reason
Turkey will need to advance the liberalization of its electricity and natural gas markets
and to enhance the governance of the energy market. A solid EU-Turkey energy
cooperation will be the only way for Turkey to carry out the reforms necessary to
accomplish these targets. For this reasons the third target of the Initiative might be the
reform of Turkey’s energy market. The EU has already played an important role in the
first steps of the liberalization of Turkey’s electricity market; further steps will need to
be taken to conclude this reform and to carry out also the one of natural gas market.
Such a process will be highly beneficial for Turkey, as it will ultimately favour the
inflow of foreign capital into the country’s energy infrastructure sector. Moreover, the
liberalization process will likely have an immediate positive effect on the competition
within the country’s energy market, an effect that will not only favour the country’s
households but also the industrial competitiveness of Turkey. Such a development
would be highly beneficial also for the public finances of Turkey, considering greatest
economic weakness of the country: the current account deficit. This element, which
currently places Turkey among the most fragile and vulnerable emerging economies, is
mainly due to the country’s energy bill. A competitive energy market could well lower
42
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the prices, ultimately contributing to ease the country’s current account deficit as well.
Furthermore, this process would be very beneficial not only for Turkey but also for EU,
as part of these energy infrastructure investments will likely target the reinforcement of
Turkey’s natural gas grid, the infrastructure through which part of additional supplies
from KRI and Israel could eventually flow towards the Turkey-EU border.
To conclude, a new EU-Turkey Natural Gas Initiative structured in the way just
presented could provide a sustainable contribution to the EU on its quest to diversify
natural gas supplies. If immediately pursued, this strategy could well add to the current
planned volume of 10 bcm/year from Azerbaijan by 2019 another 10 bcm/year from
KRI and an additional 10 bcm/year from Israel by 2020. On this scenario, the Southern
Gas Corridor would thus be practically tripled, to a supply level (30 bcm/year) equal to
the one currently covered by Qatar, the forth natural gas supplier of the EU after Russia,
Norway and Algeria. Among other things, a new EU-Turkey Natural Gas Initiative
could also well turn out to be a catalyst for the EU-Turkey energy relations. In fact, the
cooperation between the two players in the energy field is currently experiencing a deep
impasse43. Turkey’s EU accession process is stagnating and the energy chapter seems to
be far from being opened. Moreover, Turkey refused to become a member of the Energy
Community, thus excluding the only alternative of energy cooperation outside the EU
accession process. A new EU-Turkey Natural Gas Initiative could thus represent a new
way to (re-)build trust between the EU and Turkey, the fundamental prerequisite not
only for the energy cooperation between the two players, but also for the overall EUTurkey political, economic and social relations.
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